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LEASEHOLD RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY AND
EQUITY PROCEEDINGS
By A. 0. STANLEY, JR.*
PART I. LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP
HISTORICAL NOTE
The law of landlord and tenant is perhaps the clearest
example of the criticism that the law frequently fails to keep
apace with new developments in the economic and social life of
the community. The discrepancy which exists between the
actuality of modern life and the legal rules which govern land-
lord-tenant relationship is a subject of unanimous condemnation
and nowhere are the injustices which abound in this field so
evident as in the situation in which a tenant under an unexpired
lease becomes insolvent and is subjected, voluntarily or invol-
untarily, to bankruptcy or equity receivership.'
The principle if not the sole underlying cause of the dis-
satisfaction with the treatment accorded to the claim of the
landlord has been the failure to adopt the view of the average
business man that a lease contract does not differ from any other
type of executory contract. The law is persistent in treating
lease contracts apart from all others long after any valid reason
for doing so has ceased to exist. This attitude is a relic of the
periods during which socage tenure, frankalmoigne lands, and
sergeantry were live terms. The feudal system revolved about,
and was based upon, the incidents of estates in land. Life itself
was dependent upon the land. It was perhaps nautral and just
that in an agrarian and military society the concept of rent
issuing from the land should have been developed. The theory
that rent issued from the land and not as a result of a contract
* Legal staff, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Washington,
D. C. LL. B., 1936, LL. M., 1940, Columbus University
I Gerdes on Corporate Reorganizations, p. 1097, see. 683; Schwa-
bacher and Weinstein, Rent Claims in Bankruptcy (1933) 33 Col. L.
Rev. 213; Clark, Foley and Shaw, Adoption and Rejection of Contracts
and Leases by Receivers (1933) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1111; Douglas and
Frank, Landlords' Claims in Reorganization (1933) 42 Yale L. J.
1003; Holdsworth, The Prerogative in the Sixteenth Century (1921)
21 Col. L. Rev. 554 at 561.
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between the landlord and tenant, and that the law to pay for
the use of land sprang from its actual use and occupation and
not from the right to use it, may have worked a certain rough
justice in a feudal society, but has failed to meet the demands in
a commercial and industrial world.
2
The "anticipatory breach" clause of modern contracts of
lease has remedied, to some extent, this fault, provided the breach
is the act of a solvent tenant. Bankruptcy, however, usually
has the effect of annulling such clauses.3
WHETHER LANDLORD MAY SUE FR RENT OR DAmAGES Is
DETERmIn) ORDINARILy By TERMS or LEAsE
'Where there is no "anticipatory breach" incorporated into
the lease, the landlord must then refuse to recognize the breach
of lease and consider the premises still rented to the tenant, his
abandonment of it notwithstanding, and hold him responsible for
the payments of rent as they fall due. 4 This rule is predicated
upon the theory that the premises remain there for the sole use
and enjoyment of the lessee whether he actually uses them or not.
It has been held, that there is a duty vested in the landlord to
make a reasonable effort to secure a new tenant for the property
at a reasonable rental before he can recover rent from the old
tenant under the contract.5 The weight of authority, however,
is that the tenant may not by abandoning the premises, force a
duty upon the landlord to seek another tenant.6
The landlord may, on the other hand, where there is an
"anticipatory breach" incorporated in the contract of lease,
consider the contract broken by the tenant's abandonment of the
2In re Roth & Appel, 181 Fed. 667; Bloch v. Bell Furniture Co.,
111 N. J. Eq. 551, 162 Atl. 414; Gardiner v. Butler & Co., 245 U. S. 603,
38 Sup. Ct. 214; Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n,
240 U. S. 581, 36 Sup. Ct. 412; Gerdes on Corporate Reorganizations,
p. 1096-7, sec. 684; 42 Yale Law Journal 1003.
'Manhattan Properties v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U. S. 320; 54 Sup.
Ct. 385; Gerdes on Corporate Reorganizations, p. 1097.
4Heckel v. Griese, 12 N. J. Misc. 211, 171 Atl. 148; Fifty Associates
v. Berger Dry Goods Co., Inc., (Mass.) 176 N. E. 643; Moore v. Rogers,
240 Ky. 743, 43 S. W. (2d) 31; Johnson v. Neely, et al (Texas) 36
S. W. (2d) 799.
' Marmont et ux. v. Ave et ux., 135 Kans. 368, 10 Pac. (2d) 826;
Lawson v. Callaway, 131 Kans. 789.
1 Fifty Associates v. Berger Dry Goods Co., Inc., (Mass.) 176 N. E.
643; Moore v. Rogers, 240 Ky. 743, 43 S. W. (2d) 31; Johnson v.
Neely et al. (Texas) 36 S. W. (2d) 799; Heckel v. Griese, 12 N. J.
Misc. 211, 171 Atl. 148; Muller v. Beck, 94 N. J. Law 311, 110 Atl. 831.
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premises and bring his action for damages resulting from the
breach of contract. The general rule in such a case is that the
damages will be measured by the difference between the rent
stipulated in the lease and a fair rental value for the balance of
the term.7
LANDLORD MUST PROVE DAMAGES
Should the landlord proceed on this theory of damages,
according to the opinions expressed in the majority of cases in
this country, he may refuse to accept a surrender of the premises
and after notice to the lessee of his intention to do so, re-let the
premises for the best rent obtainable, and recover the dif-
ference between the rent reserved in the lease and the rent re-
ceived from the subsequent tenant.8 Upon entering, however,
the land lord must make his intention clear-that he is entering
in the interests of his tenant and is re-letting the property solely
for the tenant's benefit in order to minimize the damages ;9 where
the tenant by a covenant in the lease, however, consents that
the landlord may assume possession of the premises for non-
payment of rent, or for other cause, and re-let them for the said
tenant's benefit, such notice of landlord's purposes in re-entering
and re-letting is unnecessary.10  Moreover, the landlord must
definitely prove damages, both as to their existence and amount."
It may be seen, therefore, that in the event of a breach
of lease by a solvent tenant there is a wide diversity among the
authorities for the proper measure of damages and the procedure
that should be properly taken by the landlord to protect himself
from loss. For a further discussion of authroities, see 16 R.C.L.
969, sees. 481, 482, 483 and 484.
' Curran v. Smith-Zollinger Co., 157 Atl. 432; Monger v. Lutter-
loh, 195 N. C. 274, 142 S. E. 12; Womble v. Leigh, 195 N. C. 282, 142
S. E. 17; Bradbury v. Higginson, 162 Cal. 602, 123 Pac. 797; Brown v.
Hayes, 92 Wash. 300, 159 Pac. 89; Oldfield v. Angles Brewing Co.,
62 Wash. 260, 113 Pac. 630.
8 16 R. C. L. 969, sec. 483; also Barlow v. Wainright, 22 Vt. 88,
52 Am. Dec. 79.
'Mahonna v. Chaimson et al. (Wis.) 253 N. W. 391; Weil v.
Segura, 178 La. 421, 151 So. 639.
"Crow v. Kaupp et al (Mo.) 50 S. W. (2d) 995.
Patton v. Milwaukee Commercial Bank et al (Wis.) 268 N. W.
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PART II. GENERAL EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY OR
INSOLvENCY UPON RENT CLAIMS
EFFECT o BREACH BY INSOLVENT TENANT
In the event of the breach of a lease by an insolvent tenant,
whether such tenant be a natural person or a corporation, a far
more intricate and involved problem presents itself.
The legal existence of a corporation is not cut short by the
appointment of a trustee or chancery receiver. Even if it ceases
to be a going concern it still survives for the purposes of the
discharge of its liabilities and the final distribution of its re-
maining assets. A national bank, for instance, remains liable
during the remainder of the term for accrued and accruing rent
under a lease of the premises occupied by it although the trustee
or receiver may have abandoned and surrendered them.
12
If the landlord has a legal claim against the tenant for dam-
ages, he may properly prove this claim against the assets in the
hands of the receiver. The fact that such claim at the time it
accrues is unliquidated will not of itself defeat the claim. 13
A trustee in bankruptcy is bound by the forfeiture clauses
in lease-hold estates of the bankrupt.14 A chancery court re-
ceiver can have no better rights to retain possession of a lease-
hold than has a trustee in bankruptcy. The landlord's right to
enforce a forfeiture of the lease is not less when a chancery re-
ceiver is in possession than it is when a trustee in bankruptcy
has possession.15
LEASES PASS AS PROPERTY TO TRUSTEE
The District Court for the District of Kentucky, in deciding
In re Jefferson, 93 Fed. 948, one of the early bankruptcy cases,
held that where the tenant is adjudicated a bankrupt, the rela-
tion of landlord and tenant, ipso facto, comes to an end and con-
sequently there cannot, under Section 63, be a provable debt
Chemical National Bank v. Hartford, 161 U. S. 1, 16 Sup. Ct.
439; Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City, 198 Fed. 721; Clark on
Receivers, 2d Ed. (1929) vol. 1, sec. 442.
" Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U. S. 273, 51 Sup. Ct. 390; In re Mullings
Clothing Co., 252 Fed. 667; Kalkhoff v. Nelson, 60 Minn. 284, 61 N. W.
332; Clark on Receivers, 2d Ed. (1929) vol. 1, sec. 446.
", Odell v. H. Batterman, 223 Fed. 292; Lindke v. Associate Realty
Co., 146 Fed. 630.
"Odell v. H. Batterman, 223 Fed. 292; Clark on Receivers, 2d
Ed. (1920) vol. 1, sec. 446.
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against the bankrupt's estate for rent alleged to have accrued
after the date of. adjudication. The reason employed by the
Court in this case was that rent and use or occupation or the
right or opportunity to occupy are dependent upon correlative
terms and that rent cannot accrue without a tenant. As a result
of such reasoning, the Court reached the conclusion that the
bankrupt ceased to be a tenant after adjudication and this
adjudication destroyed all obligation on the part of both land-
lord and tenant. This case was followed in 1902 by the District
Court for the Western District of Kentucky in the case of In re
Hays, Foster & Ward Company, 117 Fed. 879. Such an opinion,
however, seems to be the minority opinion for other district
courts have not followed these decisions. 16 Loveland on Bank-
ruptcy, 3d Edition, page 365, states: "A contract of lease is not
ipso facto terminated by the bankruptcy of the lessee."
Since the bankruptcy of the lessee does not, by the great
weight of authority, ipso facto, terminate the tenancy,17 pro-
vided the lease contains no provision to that effect, it will pass
with the bankrupt's other property to the trustee.' s
CLAIYs FOR FUTURE RENT NOT ORDNARILY PROVABLE
Claims for future rent are not provable in equity receiver-
ship proceedings19 and were not provable in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings 20 prior to the adoption of amendments to Section 63.21
' Watson v. Merrill, 136 Fed. 359; In re Roth & Appel, 181 Fed.
667; Slocum et al. v. Soliday, 183 Fed. 410; In re Pennewell, 119 Fed.
139; Lamson Con. Store Ser. Co. v. Bowland, 114 Fed. 639; Atkins v.
Wilcox, 105 Fed. 595; In re Ells, 98 Fed. 967.
' Olden v. Sassman, 67 N. J. Eq. 239, 57 AUt. 1075, aff'd. 68 N. J.
Eq. 799, 64 Atl. 1134; In re Pennewell, 119 Fed. 139; In re Arnstein,
101 Fed. 706; Woodworth v. Harding, 75 App. Div. 54, 77 N. Y. S. 969;
In re Ells, 98 Fed. 967; Tiffany on Landlord and Tenant, vol. 1, p. 94.
" In re Millards, Inc. 41 F. (2d) 498; In re Scruggs, 205 Fed. 673;
In re Rubel, et al., 166 Fed. 131; Atkins v. Wilcox, 105 Fed. 595;
Tiffany on Landlord and Tenant, vol. 1, p. 94.
"Gardiner v. Butler, 245 U. S. 603, 38 Sup. Ct. 214; In re Mc-
Allister-Mohler Co., 46 F. (2d) 91; Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New
York City Ry., 198 Fed. 721; Moore v. McDuffie, 71 F. (2d) 729;
Fidelity Safe Dep. Co. v. Armstrong, 35 Fed. 567; Rogers v. United
Grape, 2 F. Supp. 70; Klein v. Gavenesch, 64 N. J. Eq. 50, 53 Atl. 196;
Gerdes on Corporate Reorganizations, p. 1108, sec. 687.
" Manhattan Properties v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U. S. 320, 54
Sup. Ct. 385; In re F. & W. Grand 5, 10, 25c Stores, 74 F. (2d) 738;
Gerdes on Corporate Reorganizations ,p. 1108, see. 687.
'Bankruptcy Act, see. 63(a) (7); 11 U. S. C. A. sec. 103(a) (7),
(Supp. 1934).
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The only way in which bankruptcy proceedings and equity
receivership differ in respect of provability of rent claims is
as to the time at which the claim has to be in existence. In bank-
ruptcy, the rent claim has to be in existence at the time of the
filing of the petition.22 Unfettered by statutory requirements
and in the belief that they were able to adopt a rule which more
nearly accorded with fairness and equity, the equity receiver.
ship courts have declared that any claim is provable which comes
into being prior to the expiration of the period set for proof of
claims, and which can be liquidated without causing delay in the
distribution of the estate.
23
In both proceedings the claim is provable if the covenant
in the lease properly fixes the damages and if the lease was
breached prior to the institution of the proceedings.
Rent to accrue in the future cannot ordinarily be proven
upon the bankruptcy of the tenant, as a claim against the
tenant's estate,24 since it is not an existing debt or claim, but is
a mere possibility of a future debt. It seems to follow from the
fact that future rent is not provable against the bankrupt's
estate, that a discharge in bankruptcy does not ordinarily re-
lieve the bankrupt from liability for rent falling due after the
adjudication or even after the filing of the petition, since the
bankruptcy act limits the effect of the discharge to provable
'Manhattan Properties v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U. S. 320, 54
Sup. Ct. 385; Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 240
U. S. 581; 36 Sup. Ct. 412; Zalvelo v. Reeves, 227 U. S. 625; 33 Sup. Ct.
365; Cantor v. Cherry, 73 F. (2d) 188; In re National Credit Clothing
Co. 66 F. (2d) 371; In re Mullings Clothing Co., 252 Fed. 667; Cole-
man Co. v. Withoft, 195 Fed. 250; Slocum v. Soliday, 183 Fed. 410;
In re Roth & Appel, 181 Fed. 667; In re Neff, 157 Fed. 57; Watson v.
Merrill, 136 Fed. 359; In re McAllister-Mohler Co., 46 F. (2d) 91;
In re Service Appliance Co., 45 F. (2d) 884; In re Ells, 98 Fed. 967;
Gerdes on Corporate Reorganizations, p. 1108, see. 687.
Gardiner v. Butler & Co., 245 U. S. 603, 38 Sup. Ct. 214; William
Filene's Sons v. Weed, 245 U. S. 597, 38 Sup. Ct. 211; Pennsylvania
Steel Co. v. New York City Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 721; Rogers v. United
Grape, 2 F. Supp. 70; Chicago Fire Place Co. v. Tait, 58 Ill. Appl. 293;
Gerdes on Corporate Reorganizations, p. 1108, sec. 687.
1 In re Hays, Foster & Ward Co., 117 Fed. 879; Wilson v. Penna.
Tr. Co., 114 Fed. 742; Atkins v. Wilcox, 105.Fed. 595; In re Mahler,
105 Fed. 428; In re Arnstein, 101 Fed. 706; Bray v. Cobb, 100 Fed.
270; In re Jefferson, 93 Fed. 948; Ex parte Houghton, 1 Low. 554,
Fed. Cas. No. 6725; Bosler v. Kuhn, 8 Watts & S. (Pa.) 183; Savory v.
Stocking, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 607; Tiffany on Landlord and Tenant,
p. 1189.
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debt& 25 The liability for rent due before the adjudication, on
the other hand, is discharged thereby, since it is provable as a
debt involving a fixed liability.26
ACCELERA.TION CLAUSES MAY RENDER FuTuRE RENT PROVABLE
The adherence to the historical concept of rent as some-
thing which issues from the land prevented a proof of claim for
future rent because such rent was not due until the period for
which it was reserved had passed.2 7 It was in an effort to meet
this situation that clauses providing for the termination and for
the liquidation of damages were devised. In the absence of such
covenants, and upon default in the terms of the lease, the land-
lord had only the right to sue for past due rent and the proof of
claim for this amount was his only remedy in bankruptcy or
equity receivership proceedings. 28
Even if the lease contained a special covenant for damages
or indemnity, it was not always certain that the claim would be
provable.
LIMITATIONS PLACED UPON ACCELERATION CLAUSES
Undoubtedly the parties to the lease may agree that bank-
ruptcy shall terminate it and that upon termination all future
installments of rent shall at once become due and payable.29 Pos-
sibly claims based upon such leases may be proved in bank-
ruptcy, for such provisions in leases have been regarded as
2 In re Roth & Appel, 181 Fed. 667; Watson v. Merrill, 136 Fed.
359; Treadwell v. Warden, 18 N. B. R. 353; Bernhardt v. Curtis, 109
La. 171, 33 So. 125; Savory v. Stocking, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 607; Lan-
sing v. Prendergast, 9 John (N. Y.) 127; Stinemets v. Ainslie, 4
Denis (N. Y.) 573; Tiffany on Landlord and Tenant, p. 1189.
"Woodworth v. Harding, 75 App. Div. 54, 77 N. Y. S. 969;
Tiffany on Landlord and Tenant, p. 1189.
"Gardiner v. Butler & Co., 245 U. S. 603, 38 Sup. Ct. 214; In re
Service Appliance Co., 45 F. (2d) 884; Bordman v. Osborn, 40 Mass.
(23 Pick.) 295; Coke on Littleton, 219 (b) sec. 513; Gerdes on Corpo-
rate Reorganizations, p. 1108, sec. 687.
1Manhattan Properties v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U. S. 320, 54
Sup. Ct. 385; Gardiner v. Butler & Co., 245 U. S. 603, 38 Sup. Ct. 214;
In re F. & W. Grand 5, 10, 25c Stores, 74 F. (2d) 738; In re Service
Appliance Co., 45 F. (2d) 884; Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York
City Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 721; In re Roth & Appel, 181 Fed. 667; Fidelity
Safe Dep. Co. v. Armstrong, 35 Fed. 567; Rogers v. United Grape, 2 F.
Supp. 70; Gerdes on Corporate Reorganizations, p. 1108, sec. 687.
" 3 R. C. L. 239, see. 68; Loveland on Bankruptcy, 3d ed. p. 365.
307,
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valid.30 It has been questioned, however, whether such a pro-
vision would be enforceable, so as to entitle the landlord to prove
a claim for future rent as against the other creditors.31 A pro-
vision that the rent for the whole term shall become due in case
of default in any installment of rent does not apply merely
because a petition in bankruptcy is filed by the tenant, no rent
being due at the time.32
If the lessor accepts a surrender of the premises or exercises
his right of re-entry the liability of the lessee is ordinarily
thereby terminated.3 3 Liability of the lessee under a lease pro-
viding that the lease shall terminate in case the lessee is declared
bankrupt, and that the lessor shall have the right to re-enter,
obligating the lessee to pay the difference between the amount
reserved in the lease and what the lessor is able to secure by
re-letting of the property, is not provable as a "fixed liability"
under Section 63a(1) ; for notwithstanding the provision as to
the termination of the lease, the latter is unquestionably ter-
minated by the re-entry and not by the bankruptcy. The lessor
is not obliged to re-enter and whether he does so or not is mani-
festly dependent upon uncertainty. Moreover, it is uncertain
at the date of the petition in bankruptcy, the ruling date for
determining provability, whether or not there will actually be
any loss of rents.3 4 If, upon the bankruptcy of the tenant, the
lessor re-enters under a proviso for re-entry in the lease, the
tenancy is necessarily terminated and neither the bankrupt nor
his trustee is thereafter liable for any rent which would other-
wise have subsequently accrued.35
Occasionally a lease provides that upon re-entry, the land-
lord may re-let the premises, and hold the lessee liable for any
deficiency between the amount of rent so obtained and the amount
originally reserved in the lease. Such contingent liability, like
that for the whole rent, cannot ordinarily be proven in bank-
soPlatt v. Johnson, 168 Penn. 47, 31 AUt. 935; Tiffany on Land-
lord and Tenant, p. 1189.
In re Winfield Mfg. Co., 137 Fed. 984; Wilson v. Pennsylvania
Steel Co., 114 Fed. 742; Tiffany on Landlord and Tenant, p. 1189.
Atkins v. Wilcox, 105 Fed. 595; Tiffany on Landlord and Tenant,
p. 1189.
3 R. C. L. 239, sec. 68.
In re Roth & Appel, 181 Fed. 667; 3 R. C. L. 239, sec. 68.
Ex parte Houghton, 1 Low. 554, Fed. Cas. No. 6725; Tiffany on
Landlord and Tenant, vol. 1, p. 980.
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ruptey proceedings. 30 The only type of clause under which
the landlord can be reasonably certain of a proof of claim is one
providing for an immediate claim for the full damages caused
by the breach, such damages to be ascertained by deducting the
present rental value for the balance of the term from the present
value of the rent stipulated for the balance of the term.3 7 Penalty
clauses are not enforceable at law and give rise to no proof of
claim.3 8
Much of the apparent conffict among the decisions as to the
provability of claims by lessors against the bankrupt estates of
lessees may be traced to the varying provisions of different
leases. 3 9
TRUSTEE MAY REJECT CONTRACT CONTAINING ACCELERATION
CLAUSE
Even where the provision of the lease is held valid and the
damages provided for therein are upheld thereby rendering a
claim for future rent provable, 40 nevertheless, the trustee may
then reject the contract of lease and render such claim not
provable.4 1 The claim for future rent is therefore neither a
liquidated nor an unliquidated provable claim unless the trustee
elects to retain the lease as an asset.4 2
]RECEIVER'S OR TRUSTEE'S RIGHT TO ELECT WHETHER OR NOT
TO ADOPT LEASES
Courts and text-writers commonly state that a receiver or
trustee may elect to adopt or to reject contracts and leases, and
that he has such a reasonable time,-a breathing space, so to
"In re Ells, 98 Fed. 967; In re Shaffer, 124 Fed. 111; Ex parte
Lake, 2 Low. 544, Fed. Cas. No. 7991; Tiffany on Landlord and Tenant,
vol. 1, p. 980.
" Gardiner v. Butler & Co., 245 U. S. 603, 38 Sup. Ct. 214; William
Filene's Sons v. Weed, 245 U. S. 597, 38 Sup. Ct. 211; In re Outfitters
Realty Co., 69 F. (2d) 90; Gerdes on Corporate Reorganizations, p.
1108, see. 687.
' Kothe v. R. C. Taylor Trust Co., 280 U. S. 224, 50 Sup. Ct. 142;
In re Barnett, 12 F. (2d) 73; Gerdes on Corporate Reorganizations,
p. 1108, sec. 687.
, 3 R. C. L. 239, sec. 68, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 271, note.
"Lamson Con. Store Ser. Co. v. Bowland, 114 Fed. 639.
'Loveland on Bankruptcy, 3d ed. p. 365.
' In re Roth & Appel, 181 Fed. 667; Watson v. Merrill, 136 Fed.
359; Atkins v. Wilcox, 105 Fed. 595; Loveland on Bankruptcy, 3d ed.,
sec. 365; 3 R. C. L. 239, sec. 68.
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speak-as will enable him to elect intelligently whether the
interest of his trust will be best served by adopting the lease or
by returning the property to the lessor, 43 nor is he bound to
accept the leasehold interest if he has reason to believe it will
be more of a burden than a benefit, and the cases are to the
effect that he incurs no liability under the lease until he actually
indicates his acceptance. He then becomes liable because, and
only because, of his own act, of electing to assume the lease,
or by taking possession of the demised premises and continuing
in possession under such circumstances as in law would be
equivalent to such an election.
44
What is an equivalent to an election by the receiver or
trustee may depend upon the circumstances in each case. There
must be some occupation and use of or some dealing and inter-
meddling with the estate, or some act, admission, or agreement,
which in terms or by necessary implication indicates an
election. 4
5
In some situations the receiver or trustee is not faced with
the problem of adoption or rejection. Contracts and leases
under which the obligations of the insolvent have been fully
performed, but those of the solvent party remain executory, are
assets of the insolvent and rights thereunder should be enforced.
On the other hand contracts and leases under which the obliga-
tions of the solvent party have been fully performed, but those
4 U. S. Trust Co. v. Wabash, W. Ry. Co., 150 U. S. 287, 14 Sup.
Ct. 86; Quincy, M. & P. R. R. v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 82, 12 Sup. Ct.
787; Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry., 198 Fed. 721; Cen-
tral Manhattan Properties v. Schulte, 91 F. (2d) 728; Fleming v.
Noble, 250 Fed. 733; General Finance Corp. v. New York State Rys.,
54 F. (2d) 1008; Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wilson, 142 U. S. 313, 12 Sup.
'Ct. 235; Minneapolis Iron Store Co. v. E. G. Staude Mg. Co., 153
Minn. 107, 189 N. W. 596; Clark on Receivers, 2d. ed. (1929) sections,
428, 433; Clark, Foley and Shaw, Adoption and Rejection of Contracts
and Leases by Receivers (1933) 46 Harv. Law Rev. 1111; Tardy's
Smith, Receivers, 2d ed. (1920) sec. 146.
"Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wilson, 142 U. S. 313, 12 Sup. Ct. 235;
"Hoyt et al. v. Stoddard, 2 Allen 442 (Mass.); Johnson v. Emerson
Phonograph, 296 Fed. 42; Primrose Chemical Co. v. Fulton Steel,
254 Fed. 454; In re Chase Commissary Corp., 11 F. Supp. 288; In re
Mullings Clothing Co., 252 Fed. 667; Fleming v. Noble, 250 Fed. 733;
Landon v. Public Utilities of Kans. 245 Fed. 950; Intercontinental
Rubber Co. v. Boston & M. R. R., 245 Fed. 127; In re Mahler, 105 Fed.
428; Bray v. Cobb, 100 Fed. 270; In re Grimes, 96 Fed. 529; Mercantile
Trust Co. v. Farmers L. & T. Co., 81 Fed. 254; Empire Distilling Co.
v. MeNulta, 77 Fed. 700; Tiffany on Landlord and Tenant, vol. 1, p.
980; -Clark on Receivers, 2d ed. (1929) vol. 1, sec. 442; Dietrick v.
O'Brien, 122 Md. 482, 89 Atl. 717.
"Clark on Receivers, 2d ed. (1929) vol. 1, sec. 442.
' 310
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of the insolvent remain executory, are liabilities and perform-
ance by the receiver would ordinarily be improper as. to
preference. 4 6
That a receiver or trustee ordinarily need not perform con-
tract or lease obligations of the insolvent is well established.
47
But if he does not perform he cannot insist on counter-perform-
ance by the solvent party,4 8 which may, in some instances, be
distinctly desirable.
4 9
The appointment of a receiver or trustee does not of itself
cancel a lease between the landlord and tenant.50
EFFECT ON TRUST ESTATE OP TRusTEE's oR RECEIVER'S
ELECTIN
Upon the bankruptcy or insolvency of the tenant, assum-
ing that this does not of itself terminate the tenancy, the tenant's
leasehold interest passes with his other property to the chancery
receiver or the trustee in bankruptcy, who may elect to take the
lease as an asset of the estate, thereby subjecting himself to
liability, like any other assignee, according to the covenants of
the lease. In such case the lease is regularly sold, subject to
future payments of rent stipulated in it. The consummation of
such sale has the effect of releasing the receiver or trustee and
the estate from further liability for rent. The purchase price
becomes an asset of the estate, subject to the payment of any
"Express Co. v. R. R. Co., 99 U. S. 191; Central Trust Co. v.
Marietta N. G. Ry., 51 Fed. 16; Whightsel v. Felton, 95 Fed. 823; Clark,
Foley and Shaw, Adoption and Rejection of Contracts and Leases by
Receivers (1933) 46 Harv. Law Rev. 1111.
" In re Chase Commissary Corp., 11 F. Supp. 288; U. S. Trust Co.
v. Wabash W. Ry. Co., 150 U. S. 287; 14 Sup. Ct. 86; Peabody Coal Co.
v. Nixon, 226 Fed. 20; Landon v. Court of Industrial Relations, 269
Fed. 423; Oscar Heineman Corp. v. Nat Levy & Co., 6 F. (2d) 970;
Universal Rim Co. v. Scott, 21 F. (2d) 346; Cooper v. McNair, 49 F.
(2d) 778; General Finance Corp. v. New York State Rys., 54 F. (2d)
1008.
"Sprague Warner & Co. v. Iowa Mercantile Co., 186 Ia. 488, 172
N. W. 637; Odell v. Bedford Co., 224 Fed. 996.
"Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 721;
Curtis v. Walpole Tire & Rubber Co., 227 Fed. 698; Texas Co. v. Inter-
national & G. N. Ry., 250 Fed. 742; Samuels v. E. F. Drew & Co., 292
Fed. 734; Win. Filene's Sons So. v. Weed, 245 U. S. 597, 38 Sup. Ct.
211; Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 240 U. S. 581, 36
Supp. Ct. 412; Clark, Foley and Shaw, Adoption and Rejection of
Contracts and Leases by Receivers (1933) 46 Harvard Law Rev.
1111-1112.
Clark on Receivers, 2d ed. (1929) vol. 1, sec. 446.
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accrued rent secured by such lien as may have been reserved in
the lease.5-
If the receiver or trustee elects to reject the contract of lease,
as he has a right to do, it is a nullity so far as the proceedings
are concerned. In such a case future rent although made due
and payable at once by the terms of the lease, is not a provable
debt. The landlord may prove his claim for rent due prior to
bankruptcy or receivership for the use and occupation of the
premises either as a "fixed liability due and owing" or as "a
debt arising in contract". For the same reason subsequent use
and occupancy of the premises by the trustee or receiver will
establish a provable claim for rent for such use and occupancy. 5 2
It must be borne in mind, however, that where the trustee
or receiver does not elect to carry out the lease then the lease,
as between the landlord and tenant, is broken and the land-
lord has the right to recover damages against his tenant for
breach of contract or he may have other remedies against his
tenant. Such a breach of contract not being affected by the
receiver himself is not a breach of contract by reason of any
act of his and the claim of damages for breach of such lease is
not strictly against the trustee or receiver, but it may under
certain conditions be a claim against the assets in his hands.53
ENFORCEABILITY OF LIENS AGAINST TRUST ESTATE
Where a covenant of the lease, or state law entitles the land-
lord to a lien upon the premises or goods of the tenant to secure
the payment of rent, the court will enforce the lien as against
the proceeds of such goods when sold by the trustee,54 and to
the extent of the lien, the landlord will be a preferred creditor. 55
It has been held that where the landlord does not have a lien
protecting him against a breach of lease, he still may maintain an
action for damages against the tenant, but his claim will be a
general creditor's claim and will share ratably with other un-
I Loveland on Bankruptcy, 3d ed., sec. 365; Tiffany on Landlord
& Tenant, vol. 1, page 980.
'In re Hinckel Brewing Co., 123 Fed. 942; Loveland on Bank-
ruptcy, 3d ed., p. 365.
Clark on Receivers, 3d ed., vol. 1, sec. 446.
In re Mitchell, 116 Fed. 87; Wilson v. Penn Trust Co., 114 Fed.
742; In re Sapinsky & Sons, 206 Fed. 523; In re Scruggs, 205 Fed. 673;
Martin v. Orgain, 174 Fed. 772; Loveland on Bankruptcy, 3d ed. 365.
"Fee-Crayton Hdw. Co. v. Richardson-Warren Co., 18 F. (2d)
617; Clark on Receivers, 2d ed. (1929) vol. 1, sec. 446.
LEASEHOLD RIGHTS
secured debts.56 This, however, does not ordinarily apply to
rent to accrue in the future.
57
MN.EASUrE OF RENT OBLIGATION ASSUMED BY RECEIVER FOR
PERIOD OF OCCUPATION
The question frequently comes up when a receiver re-
fuses to be bound by the obligations of an executory lease, but
nevertheless holds on to the property until he elects,-what is
the measure of the obligation he does assume for use and occupa-
tion of the property-is it on the basis of the rental reserved
in the lease or some other basis? Strictly speaking, he cannot be
liable for the rental reserved in the lease, neither is he a suc-
cessor, strictly speaking, of the lessee. The sovereignty through
the courts steps in and occupies the premises with or without the
lessor's consent. The Constitution of the United States pro-
vides as does the constitution of most of the states that property
shall not be taken even by the state without due compensation.
It therefore follows that the lessor is entitled to due compensa-
tion and that this compensation should be determined, if the
matter were pushed to the limit, in the same way, by an im-
partial jury or otherwise as the matter is determined, when the
state takes the property by reason of its power of eminent
domain. Such value, in all probability, would be the reasonable
rental value of the premises occupied by the receiver during
his occupancy. s
RECEIVERS Am NOT ASsIGNEms IN THE GENERAL SENSE
o1' THE TERM
The liability of a receiver, as an assignee of the leasehold,
upon the covenants of the lease, including that for rent, would
seem primarily, to depend upon whether or not the title to prop-
erty of that character is vested in the receiver by his appoint-
ment. Whether a receiver, by his appointment, obtains title
to the property of which he is given control is a matter on which
the decisions are by no means in accord; but it seems that, by
"In re Mullings Clothing Co., 252 Fed. 667; Kalhoff v. Nelson,
60 Minn. 284, 62 N. W. 332; Clark on Receivers, 2d ed., sec. 446.
"' In re Scruggs, 205 Fed. 673; Lamson Cons. Store Serv. Co. v.
Bowland, 114 Fed. 639; Bray v. Cobb, 100 Fed. 270; Manhattan Prop-
erties v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U. S. 320, 54 Sup. Ct. 385.
"Kneeland v. American Loan Co., 136 U. S. 89, 10 Sup. Ct. 950;
Clark on Receivers, 2d ed., sec. 442.
K. L. J.-5
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the weight of authority, a receiver, apart from statute, is to be
regarded as a mere custodian and representative of the court
and not as having title to the property. So regarded, it does
not appear that a receiver appointed for a tenant should, unless
an appointment were actually made of him by the tenant, be
held liable on the covenants of the lease as an assignee, and
there are cases to that effect. 59
Recognizing that merely the appointment of a receiver does
not make the receiver the assignee of the term of the lease and
does not make him, strictly speaking, the successor of the original
lessee, therefore, a receiver is not ordinarily bound by the terms
of the lease which he finds in existence. The courts, however,
have frequently regarded the receiver as liable on such cove-
nants, as being an assignee by operation of law,a0 provided he
has indicated an intention to accept the leasehold as a part of the
assets of the insolvent tenant, but not otherwise. 0 ' The cases
are generally to the effect that the assumption of physical pos-
session and control of the leased premises by the receiver does not
show an acceptance by him of the leasehold interest, so as to im-
pose liability on him as an assignee of the leasehold, but that he
may retain possession for a "reasonable time", and then give
up the property if it seems expedient. 62 A receiver has indeed
rarely been held liable, as assignee of the leasehold for a period
beyond that of his actual occupation, though he has occasionally
5,Gaither v. Stockbridge, 67 Md. 222, 9 Atl. 632, 10 AtI. 309; Bell
v. American Protective League, 163 Mass. 558, 40 N. E. 857; Trades-
man Pub. Co. v. Knoxville Car Wheel Co., 95 Tenn. 634, 32 S. W.
1097; Mariner v. Crocker, 18 Wis. 251; Stokes v. Hoffman House,
167 N. Y. 554, 60 N. E. 667; In re Otis, 101 N. Y. 580, 5 N. E. 571; Tif-
fany on Landlord and Tenant, vol. 1, p. 984.
"Link Belt Machine Co. v. Hughes, 174 Ill. 155, 51 N. E. 179;
DeWolf v. Royal Trust Co., 173 Ill. 435, 50 N. E. 1049; Woodruff v.
Erie R. Co., 93 N. Y. 609; Frank v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co., 122 N. Y.
197, 25 N. E. 332; Wells v. Higgins, 132 N. Y. 459, 30 N. E. 861; Tiffany
on Landlord and Tenant, p. 984.
' Spencer v. Worlds Col. Ex., 163 Ill. 117, 45 N. E. 250; Tiffany on
Landlord and Tenant, p. 984.
"
' Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wilson, 142 U. S. 313, 12 Sup. Ct. 235;
Quincy M. & P. R. Co. v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 82; 12 Sup. Ct. 787;
U. S. Trust Co. v. Wabash W. Ry. Co., 150 U. S. 287, 14 Sup. Ct. 86;
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 58 Fed. 257; Cars-
well v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 74 Fed. 88; Empire Distilling Co.
v. McNulta, 77 Fed. 700; N. Y. P. & 0. R. Co. v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co.,
58 Fed. 268; Park v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co., 57 Fed. 799; Clyde v.
Richmond & D. R. Co., 63 Fed. 21; Dayton Hydraulic Co. v. Felsen-
thal, 116 Fed. 961; Tradesman Pub. Co. v. Knoxville Car Wheel Co.,
95 Tenn. 634, 32 S. W. 1097; Tiffany on Landlord and Tenant, p. 984.
LEASEHOLD RIGHTS
been so held.6 3 The receiver has a reasonable time after his
appointment to examine into such contracts and he is not bound
thereby until he has so examined them and assumed their bur-
dens."4 The rule, however, is not reciprocal and the other party
to the contract remains liable for the full performance of his
obligation, if the receiver so demands.65
LANDLORD'S REMEDY iN GL-NERtA
As to whether, upon a receiver refusing to carry out a con-
tract, the contractee is altogether without a remedy, the deci-
sions are in conflict. Where the breach of the contract occurs
before the receiver takes charge, the contractee has a general
claim against the receivership estate, similar to that of any other
unsecured creditor. 'Where the breach occurs after the receiver-
ship, the question of liability, according to the decided cases,
appears to depend, to a certain extent, upon the nature of the
contract and the nature of the receivership. For example, some
courts hold that there is a liability where the contract repudiated
is a lease,06 or a contract for personal services, but not as to
other contracts, while other courts distinguish between cases
where the receivership is with the consent of the defendant cor-
poration or in spite of its opposition. Where a receiver is ap-
pointed with the consent of the defendant corporation, it has
been held that the prevention of performance was not the act
of the law, but the voluntary act of the corporation liable on the
contract and the contractee is in the same position as if his
contract has been breached by the corporation prior to receiver-
ship. 67 On the other hand, where the receiver was appointed
without the consent of the defendant corporation, it has been
held that the prevention of performance was the act of the law
and that damages for the breach were not recoverable. 68 Even
DeWolf v. Royal Trust Co., 173 Ill. 435, 50 N. E. 1049; People v.
National Trust Co., 82 N. Y. 283.
" Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wilson, 142 U. S. 313, 12 Sup. Ct. 235; Gen-
eral Electric Co. v. Whitney, 74 Fed. 664; United Elec. Sec. Co. v.
Light Co., 71 Fed. 615.
' Tracy on Corporate Foreclosures (1929) sec. 83, p. 99; Beach on
Receivers, sec. 328.
"Chemical National Bank v. Hartford Deposit Co., 161 U. S. 1,
16 Sup. Ct. 439; In re Mullings Clothing Co., 252 Fed. 667.
'Curtis v. Walpole Tire & Rubber Co., 227 Fed. 698; Tracy on
Corporate Relations (1929) sec. 84, p. 100.
" Malcomson v. Wappoo Mills, 88 Fed. 680; In re Inman, 175 Fed.
312.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
where the established rule in the particular jurisdiction is, that
in case of the rejection of a contract by a receiver the contractee
has no claim against the receivership assets until all other credi-
tors have been paid in full, the court may, nevertheless, if an
inequitable result would follow the application of such rule,
order damages to be paid from receivership assets. In such case,
however, the damages allowed are not necessarily those specified
in the contract, but are such damages as the court shall deter-
mine should be awarded in order to do equity.
69
It is, however, generally held or assumed that apart from
any question of the leasehold the landlord is entilted to pay-
ment of rent for the period of the receiver's occupation for the
purpose of settling the estate as one of the expenses of the re-
ceivership,70 at least to the extent of the earnings7 ' or the
rental value72 of the property73 Such a payment of rent is a
sum quantum meruit for the actual occupation of the property
and is in the nature of expenses, and therefore, a charge upon
the assets, but the landlord has no right to distrain for it.
4
EFFECT OF RECEIVER'S HOLDING
BEYOND TERm oF LEASE
Moreover a receiver holding over beyond a term is not for
that reason merely to be considered as a tenant from year to year.
If he sees fit to adopt the lease he does so for the fixed and definite
period. A receiver is merely an arm of the court assisting in
winding up the affairs of the insolvent and protecting the in-
terests of the creditors. If he remains after the term, therefore,
from the very character of his duties, the law will not imply
, Coy v. Title G. & T. Co., 198 Fed. 275; Tracy on Corporate Fore-
closures (1929) sec. 84, p. 100.
" Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wilson, 142 U. S. 313, 12 Sup. Ct. 235;
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. No. Pac. R. Co., 58 Fed. 257; Central
Manhattan Properties v. Schulte, 91 F. (2d) 728; Oscar Heineman v.
Levy, 6 F. (2d) 970; Carswell v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 74 Fed.
88; Dayton Hydraulic Co. v. Felsenthel, 116 Fed. 961; Frank v.
N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co., 122 N. Y. 197, 25 N. E. 332; Stoepel v. Union
Trust Co., 121 Mich. 281, 80 N. W. 13; Tiffany on Landlord and
Tenant, p. 984.1 United States Trust Co. v. Wabash W. Ry. Co., 150 U. S. 287, 14
Sup. Ct. 86; Clyde v. Richmond D. R. Co., 63 Fed. 21; Park v.
N. V. L. E. & W. R. Co., 57 Fed. 799; Tiffany on Landlord and Tenant,
p. 984.
" Carswell v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 74 Fed. 88.
'Tiffany on Landlord and Tenant, p. 984.
"Lowell on Bankruptcy, sec. 376.
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that he is creating a new tenancy from year to year. The con-
tinued occupation of the premises by the receiver after the
expiration of the term, without any further agreement or action
upon the part of either the lessor or receiver, will by implication
of law, constitute a tenancy at will and nothing moreY5
PART III. RAmROAD RECEIVERSHIPS AND REORGANIZATIONS
INTRODUCTION
We have been considering heretofore the law relating to
landlord and tenant with particular reference to the injury and
damages accruing to the landlord because of an abandonment
of the premises by the tenant resulting in the breach of a con-
tract of lease. Such breach may have been caused by the volun-
tary act of a solvent tenant in which event the landlord has an
action at law to recover damages for his injury caused thereby.
The breach may, on the other hand, have been caused directly
or indirectly by the insolvency of the tenant resulting in either
an equity reorganization or bankruptcy, and in this latter case
the procedure is neither as simple nor is the law as well settled.
The general law of bankruptcy and equity receiverships applica-
ble to such a situation has heretofore been discussed.
PUBLIC NATURE OF RAILROAD CORPORATIONS
When a railroad company goes into equity receivership or
files its petition under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, a
highly involved and technical proceeding, of necessity, results.
The insolvency, bankruptcy or financial reorganization of a
railroad not only affects its security holders and creditors but
it is likewise of vital interest to the public generally. Because
of the public nature of the enterprise, the road must be kept
a going concern, the mails of the government must be trans-
ported, and the performance of the other duties of common
carriers must not be permitted to be interrupted. 76
Unprofitable branch lines are frequently burdensome to the
system as a whole. An early disposition, abandonment, or lease
cancellation may be advisable, since such leases and operating
' Dietrick v. O'Brien, 122 Md. 482, 89 At. 717; Clark on Receivers
2d ed. (1929) vol. 1, sec. 443.
"' Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 58 Fed. 257;
Quincy, etc., R. Co. v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 82, 12 Sup. Ct. 787.
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contracts are considerable factors in railroad financial
difficulties.
7 7
* When an equity receiver is appointed for a railroad which
embraces leased lines, he does not necessarily assume responsi-
bility for the covenants of the leases, nor take the place of the
lessees, but he like any other receiver, is entitled to a reasonable
time in which to determine whether to adopt or renounce such
leases; this has always been the general rule in equity receiver-
ship cases.7 8 But upon adoption he becomes liable thereon and
the estate is charged with the cost of performing the contract or
with damages for its breach.
7 9
POWERS AND DUTIES OF RAILWAY RECEIVERS
Railway receivers are equity receivers, and as such, are
ministerial officers appointed by a Court of Chancery to take
possession of and preserve pendente lite the fund or property in
litigation. They are neither representatives of the insolvent
corporation nor of its creditors or stockholders, but are officers
and representatives of the court, the hands of the court in which
it holds the property while it operates the railroads of the
insolvent corporation for the benefit of those ultimately entitled
to the property and income. They derive their authority from
the act of the court appointing them and not from the act of
the parties at whose suggestion or by whose consent they are
appointed. They are therefore not assignees; they do not take
Johnson on Bankruptcy Reorganizations, p. 376, sec. 448.
"Quincy, M. & P. R. Co. v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 82, 12 Sup.
Ct. 787; St. Jos. & St. L. R. Co. v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 105, 12 Sup.
Ct. 795; U. S. Trust Co. v. Wabash W. Ry. Co., 150 U. S. 287; 14 Sup.
Ct. 86; Central Manhattan Properties v. Schulte, 91 F. (2) 728; Farm-
ers L. & T. Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 58 Fed. 257; Fosdick v. Schall,
99 U. S. 251; In re Chase Commissary Corp., 11 F. Supp. 288; New
York, etc., R. Co. v. New York, etc., R. Co., 58 Fed. 268; Ames v. U. P.
Ry. Co., 60 Fed. 966; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Farmers L. & T. Co., 81
Fed. 254; Penn. Steel Co. v. N. Y. City R. Co., 198 Fed. 721; Park v.
New York, etc., R. Co., 57 Fed. 799; Central Trust Co. v. Wabash St.
L. & P. Ry. Co., 23 Fed. 863, 34 Fed. 259; Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg.
Co. v. Brooklyn R. T. Co., 6 F. (2d) 547; Sparhawk v. Yerkes, 142
U. S. 1, 12 Sup. Ct. 104; American File Co. v. Garrett, 110 U. S.
288, 4 Sup. Ct. 90; Butterworth v. Degnon Contracting Co., 214 Fed.
772; General Finance Corp. v. New York State Railways, 54 F. (2d)
1008; Denver v. Stenger, 295 Fed. 809; High on Receivers, p. 321;
Smith on Receivers, p. 105; Clark on Receivers, 2d ed. vol. 2, sec. 871.
" Quincy, etc., R. Co. v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 82, 12 Sup. Ct. 787;
Penn. Steel Co. v. N. Y. City R. Co., 198 Fed. 721; U. S. Trust Co. v.
Wabash W. Ry. Co., 150 U. S. 287, 14 Sup. Ct. 86.
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by assignment and the effect of taking possession of a leasehold
interest belonging to the company is totally unlike that resulting
from one who takes the lease by assignment.80
RECEIVERS ARu NOT BOUND BY EXECUTORY CONTRACTS
AND LEASES
The utmost effect of a receiver's appointment is to put the
property from the date of his appointment into his custody as
an officer of the court, for the benefit of the party ultimately
proved to be entitled, but neither the title or even the right of
possession in the property is changed; nor does his appoint-
ment change the title to the property in his charge or alter any
lien or contract.8 1
Since a receiver does not by possession, or rather by mere
custody, become an assignee of the lease he is not bound to adopt
the contracts of the corporation or accept the losses if, in his
opinion, it would be unprofitable and undesirable to continue
operation beyond a period to ascertain the wisdom of adoption
or repudiation of the contract. The court is not bound to pay
the debts or to perform the obligations of the insolvent, nor are
its receivers.
8 2
I Quincy, M. & P. R. Co. v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 82, 12 Sup. Ct.
787; Chicago Union Bank v. Kansas City Bank, 136 U. S. 223, 10 Sup.
Ct. 1013; Penn. Steel Co. v. N. Y. City R. Co., 198 Fed. 721; New York
P. & 0. R. Co. v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 58 Fed. 268; Ames v.
U. P. Ry. Co., 60 Fed. 966; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Farmers, L. & T.
Co., 81 Fed. 254.
Quincy, M. & P. R. Co. v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 82, 12 Sup. Ct.
787; Chicago Union Bank v. Kansas City Bank, 136 U. S. 223, 10 Sup.
Ct. 1013; Penn. Steel Co. v. N. Y. City Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 721.
Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Brooklyn R. T. Co., 6 F. (2d)
547; General Finance Corp. v. New York State Ry., 54 F. (2d) 1008;
U. S. Trust Co. v. Wabash W. Ry. Co., 150 U. S. 287, 14 Sup. Ct. 86;
Denver v. Stenger, 295 Fed. 809; Sparhawk v. Yerkes, 142 U. S. 1, 12
Sup. Ct. 104; Quincy, M. & P. R. Co. v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 82, 12
Sup. Ct. 787; St. Jos. & St. L. R. Co. v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 105, 12
Sup. Ct. 795; Farmers L. & T. Co. v. Northern Pac. Co., 58 Fed. 257;
New York P. & 0. R. Co. v. New York L. E. & W. R. Co., 58 Fed. 268;
Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 251; In re Chase Commissary Corp., 11 F.
Supp. 288; Central Trust Co. v. Wabash St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 23 Fed.
863, 34 Fed. 259; Express Co. v. Railway, 99 U. S. 191; Park v. New
York, etc., R. Co., 57 Fed. 799; Penn. Steel Co. v. N. Y. City Ry. Co.,
198 Fed. 721; Ames v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 60 Fed. 966; High on
Receivers, p. 321; Smith on Receivers, p. 105.
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RAILWAY RECEIVERS ARE ALLOWED A RrSoxABiI TimE
TO ELECT WHETHER OR NOT TO ADOPT LEASES
It is the duty of a receiver before electing whether or not
to adopt the lease to carefully compare the advantages and
disadvantages of every lease, traffic or other executory contract,
in the light of the whole situation. The interest of the lessee
company is not, and should not, be the controlling factor in
reaching a conclusion whether or not to accept the benefits
and assume the burdens of such a lease or contract. He should
bear in mind at all times that he does not represent merely the
interest of the bankrupt but that he is appointed to represent all
interests equally.83
Before making his election, however, the receiver is
entitled to a "reasonable time" in which to decide whether he
will adopt the contract or return the property to the lessor in
good condition. He must also surrender the title to any
extensions built during the term of the lease, including all tools
and equipment added or substituted, and any other property
used in connection with the operation of the leased property.8 4
The "reasonable time", or breathing space, so to speak, varies
considerably with the existing circumstances of the individual
case; it has been held in one case that such an election must be
made within ninety days8 5 and nearly a year and a half has
been allowed in another.8 6
If the receiver accepts the benefit of a lease for an unreason-
able length of time, however, adoption may thereby be implied
and the receiver will be deemed to have assumed the liability of
the lease. But unless and until he does adopt the lease either
expressly or impliedly, there is no privity of contract and no
liability upon the lease will attach.
87
Ames v. U. P. Ry. Co., 60 Fed. 966; New York, etc., R. Co. v.
New York, etc., R. Co., 58 Fed. 268.
" Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wilson, 142 U. S. 313, 12 Sup. Ct. 235;
Quincy, Mo. & P. R. Co. v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 82, 12 Sup. Ct. 787;
American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York Rys. Co., 293 Fed.
633; Platt on Leases, vol. 2, p. 435.
'Ames v. U. P. Ry. Co., 60 Fed. 966.
" U. S. Trust Co. v. Wabash W. Ry. Co., 150 U. S. 287, 14 Sup. Ct.
86.
' Ames v. U. P. Ry. Co., 60 Fed. 966; Pennsylvania Steel Co. v.
New York City Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 721.
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EFFECT oF ADOPTIoN or LEASE BY RECEIVERS
When the receiver makes his election whether to adopt or
repudiate a lease, such election is retroactive and ordinarily
dates back to the beginning of the receivership. 88
If the receiver accepts and adopts the lease he becomes
vested with the title to the leasehold interest and privity of
estate is thereby created between the lessor and the receiver
whereby the receiver becomes liable upon all the covenants of the
lease, including the covenant to pay rent.8 9 The adopted lease
then becomes an integral part of the operating expenses of the
trust estate in the hands of the receiver as much as any other
ordinary expense of operation; and in this way the claim for
rent as stipulated in the lease secures a preference in payment
over all the cestuis que trustent out of the proceeds from the sale
of the railroad as well as out of its earnings during receiver-
ship.
9 0
Such moneys expended and liability incurred by the
receiver or trustee in the authorized operation, preservation and
management of the property entrusted to him also constitute
preferential claims upon the trust estate, which must be paid
out of its proceeds before they can be distributed to the
beneficiaries of the trust.91
However, under Section 77, subsection (b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, as amended, 1935, the adoption of the lease may
only bind the receiver and the plan of reorganization may
disregard entirely such adoption by the receiver.
92
I Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Brooklyn R. T. Co., 6 F. (2d)
547; Central Manhattan Properties v. Schulte, 91 F. (2d) 728; In re
Chase Commissary Corp., 11 F. Supp. 288.
"Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 721;
Chicago Union Bank v. Kansas City Bank, 136 U. S. 223, 10 Sup. Ct.
1013; Gaither v. Stockbridge, 67 Md. 222, 9 Atl. 632, 10 Atl. 309; Sun-
flower Oil Co. v. Wilson, 142 U. S. 313, 12 Sup. Ct. 235.
"Mercantile Trust Co. v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 81 Fed. 254;
Butler v. Cockrill, 73 Fed. 945; Ames v. U. P. Ry. Co., 74 Fed. 335;
Meechem, Ag. sec. 684; 2 Jones, Liens, sections 1175-1177.
"Butler v. Cockrill, 73 Fed. 945; Ames v. U. P. Ry. Co., 60 Fed.
966, 74 Fed. 335; Meecham, Ag. sec. 684; 2 Jones, Liens, sections 1175-
1177.
"See page 40, infra.
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DUTIES AND LIABIIES OF RAILWAY
RECEivER uPON FALURE TO ADOPT LEASE
In the event the receiver does not elect to adopt a contract
of lease and thereby bind himself and the trust estate therto,
but either repudiates the lease entirely or gives notice that he
does not intend to adopt the lease, his resulting duty and
liability to the lessor will be determined by the many and vary-
ing conditions and circumstances of the particular situation.
Claims for rent accrued and unpaid before receivership,
upon.refusal of the receiver to adopt the lease are not entitled
to any priority or preference. 98 They are unsecured liabilities
and must rank along with all claims of the same class as final
distribution of the assets of the lessee company.9 4
The accruing or current duties and liabilities of the
receiver to the lessor railroad company are not so simple for its
plight is indeed serious. It is seldom so situated that it can
immediately take back its property and resume the operation
thereof. It may have no working organization. Its rolling
stock may have become worn out. It may have insufficient
immediate funds. Its public duties, however, must be performed
without interruption. It is a quasi public corporation and must
keep its railroad going. Its franchises must be preserved.
Its obligations as a common carrier must be fulfilled. And these
obligations can seldom be fulfilled except by the continued
operation of the leased road by the receiver.95
If a receiver wishes to reject a contract of lease and at the
same time has a present duty to continue the operation of the
lessee's trains, he must first apply to the Interstate Commerce
Commission for authority to abandon the line, and in all likeli-
hood the time consumed by the Commission in authorizing such
'American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York Rys. Co.,
293 Fed. 633; Thomas v. Western Car Co., 149 U. S. 95, 13 Sup. Ct.
824; Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Rys. Co., 198 Fed. 721,
Aff'd 216 Fed. 458; Central Trust Co. v. Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co., 65
Fed. 264; Stevenson v. Marble, 84 Fed. 23; Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Central Trust Co., 87 Fed. 500; Gregg v. Mercantile Trust Co., 109
Fed. 220; St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Continental Trust Co., 111 Fed. 669.
"New York P. & 0. R. Co. v. New York L. E. & W. R. Co., 58
Fed. 268; Huidekoper v. Loco. Wks., 99 U. S. 258; Fosdick v. Schall,
99 U. S. 251; Union Trust Co. v. Illinois M. Ry. Co., 117 U. S. 434, 6
Sup. Ct. 809; Thomas v. Western Car Co., 149 U. S. 95, 13 Sup. Ct.
824.
"Penn. Steel Co. v. New York City Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 721.
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abandonment may be included in the "reasonable time"
admittedly allowed the receiver in which to elect whether to
adopt or repudiate the contract of lease.98
LBImLITY oF RmwAY RECEIVERS
DuRING PERIOD OF PROVISIONAL OPERATION
During the period of provisional operation, the lease in no
way governs the relations between the receiver and the lessor.
Such relations are ruled by the equities of the situation, for it is
well settled by the great weight of authority, in the case of rail-
road leases, that a receiver of the lessee corporation by provision-
ally operating the leased road does not thereby become bound to
pay rent for the period at the rate stipulated in the lease. In
the absence of special equities he does his full duty when he
turns over to the lessor the entire net earnings of the road,
acquired by him during such period of operation.
97
Where the leased line or subdivision of a system earns a
surplus over expenses rental must be paid to the extent of the
surplus, but where a subdivision simply pays operating expenses,
no rental will be paid and the line earning nothing beyond its
operating expenses, and its possession not having been
demanded by its owners, the receiver is not liable for any rent.98
The reason for the rule that the receiver is bound to account
only for net earnings is apparently based on the lessor's
acquieseense. If, then, the receiver turns over the entire earn-
ings of the road the acquiescing lessor cannot equitably demand
more.9 9 Moreover it has been held that where there are no net
earnings, and the leased road has been operated with a deficit,
the acquiescing lessor will be required to make up the
deficiency.10 0
"Gaston v. Rutland R. Co., 35 F. (2d) 685.
Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Brooklyn R. T. Co., 6 F. (2d)
547; Penn. Steel Co. v. New York City Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 721; U. S.
Trust Co. v. Wabash W. Ry. Co., 150 U. S. 287, 14 Sup. Ct. 86; Mercan-
tile Trust Co. v. Farmers L. & T. Co., 81 Fed. 254; Park v. New York,
etc., R. Co., 57 Fed. 799; New York, etc., Co. v. New York, etc., Co. 58
Fed. 268; Central Trust Co. v. Wabash St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 34 Fed. 259;
Farrar v. Southwestern R. Co., 116 Ga. 337, 42 S. E. 527.
"Central Trust Co. v. Wabash St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 23 Fed. 863;
U. S. Trust Co. v. Wabash W. Ry. Co., 150 U. S. 287, 14 Sup. Ct. 86.
"Penn. Steel Co. v. N. Y. City Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 721.
"Penn. Steel Co. v. N. Y. City Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 721; Mercantile
Trust Co. v. Farmers L. & T. Co., 81 Fed. 254.
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RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OP LFmOB Or RAILWAY
PROPERTY WHOSE LEA E HAS NOT BEEN ADOPTED
If either the lessor or subdivisional mortagee is not satis-
fied with the earnings allowed him on the pro rata basis as afore-
mentioned, he may at any time proceed to assert his rights by
foreclosure. While the court will continue to operate the leased
branch lines and subdivisions of the insolvent until some applica-
tion is made, yet the right of the lessor or mortgagee whose rent
or interest is unpaid to insist upon possession or foreclosure will
be promptly recognized. 10 '
While in the absence of such demand for repossession by the
lessor, his acquiescence will be implied, and the receiver will be
assumed to operate the property for his benefit, and will not,
therefore, be required to pay for its use out of the proceeds
belonging to creditors who have a claim superior to such
lessor; :102 yet if the lessor does not acquiesce, if it knock at the
door of the court and demand back its property it will then be
in a position to dictate its own terms for the further use of the
property. Such demand having been refused, the receiver must
thereafter pay for the continued use and occupation of the
property according to the terms set out by the lessor, and the
compensation paid for such use will ordinarily be measured by
the covenants and stipulations of the lease.103
THE BoYD CASE
At the termination of an equity receivership, and after the
debts of the insolvent corporation have been scaled down and its
stock issues readjusted by a plan of reorganization agreed upon
by a majority of the interested parties, if such plan or agreement
provides that if the corporate property is transferred to a new
company having the same shareholders, the transaction will be
binding between the parties, but will not defeat the claim of a
non-assenting creditor. As against him, according to the
Supreme Court decision in the Boyd Case the transfer or sale is
void in equity, regardless of the motive with which it was made.
U. S. Trust Co. v. Wabash W. Ry. Co., 150 U. S. 287, 14 Sup. Ct.
86; Central Tr. Co. v. Wabash St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 23 Fed. 863.
'St. Jos. & St. L. R. Co. v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 105, 12 Sup.
Ct. 795.
'Penn. Steel Co. v. N. Y. City Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 721; Farmers
L. & T. Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 58 Fed. 257; Westinghouse Elec.
& Mfg. Co. v. Brooklyn R. T. Co., 6 F. (2d) 547.
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When the non-assenting creditor establishes his debt, the sub-
ordinate interest of the old stockholders, in the hands of the
reorganized company, will still be subject to his claim. Any
device, whether by private contract or judicial sale under
consent decree, whereby stockholders are preferred before
creditors, is invalid.
10 4
If the unsecured creditor declines a fair offer he is left to
protect himself as any other creditor of a judgment debtor, and
having refused to come into a just reorganization cannot there-
after be heard in a court of equity to attack it.
If no tender is made the creditor, and kept good, however,
he retains the right to subject the interest of the old stock-
holders in the property to the payment of his debt. If their
interest is valuless, he gets nothing. If it be valuable he merely
subjects that which the law had originally and continuously
made liable for the payment of corporate liabilities.10 5
EFFECT OF SECTION 77 OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT UPON
RENT C Is
During the years 1933 to 1935 the Congress dealt on several
occasions with landlords' claims for future rent. The Act of
March 3, 1933, made provision for the relief of individual
debtors, agricultural and non-agricultural, and for railroad re-
organization. Section 74 defined creditors thus: "The term
'creditor' shall include for the purpose of an extension proposal
under this section all holders of claims of whatever character
against the debtor or his property including a claim for future
rent, whether or not such claims would otherwise constitute
provable claims under this Act. A claim for future rent shall
constitute a provable debt and shall be liquidated under section
63(b) of this Act."' 0 6 The Act of June 7, 1934, supplied pro-
cedure for corporate reorganization with arrangements per-
2MNorthern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup.
Ct. 554; San Francisco & N. P. R. R. v. Bee, 48 Calif. 398; Grenell v.
Detroit Gas Co., 112 Mich. 70 N. W. 413.
'Northern Pac. Railway Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct.
10 47 Stat. 1467-68
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
mitting the proof of claims for future rent.10 These provisions
have been upheld.' 08
The first provisions for proof of claims for future rent in
railroad reorganizations appeared in the Act of March 3, 1933,
simultaneously with the broadening of the Bankruptcy Act to
include the railroads as debtors.
In the event the trustee should elect not to adopt an existing
executory contract or lease the rights of the injured contractee
or lessor are provided for under the Act as follows:
"Subsection (b):
The term 'creditors' shall include, for all purposes of this section
all holders of claims of whatever character against the debtor or its
property, whether or not such claims would otherwise constitute
provable claims under this Act, including the holder of a claim under
a contract executory in whole or in part including an unexpired
lease.
"* * * In case an executory contract or unexpired lease of
property shall be rejected, or shall not have been adopted by a trus-
tee appointed under this section, or shall have been rejected by a
receiver in equity in a proceeding pending prior to the institution
of a proceeding under this section, or shall be rejected by any plan,
any person injured by such non-adoption or rejection shall for all
purposes of this section be deemed to be a creditor of the debtor to
the extent of the actual damage or injury determined in accordance
with the principles obtaining in equity proceedings."
It is first to be noted that the successive acts of the Congress,
on extension of individual debts and corporate and railroad re-
organization, are directed generally at the rehabilitation of
debtors.' 0 9 As one of the means used consistently to accomplish
this, claims for future rent are made provable and dischargeable,
so that the debtor would not be burdened with the rent obliga-
tion after discharge. 110 Next, the limitation of the amount of
future rent recoverable to one year in Section 4 and to three
years in Section 1[77B(b)] of the Act of June 7, 1934, leaves
no doubt that the Congress deemed a definite formula advan-
tageous in bankruptey and general corporate reorganization.
Its failure to provide an exact measure in railroad reorganiza-
tions shows it was not there considered appropriate. Finally,
1048 Stat. 915.
' Connecticut Ry. and Lighting Co. v. Palmer et al., 305 U. S. 493,
59 S. Ct. 316, 83 L. E. 309; City Bank Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U. S.
433; Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U. S. 445, 57 Sup. Ct. 298.
'. Adair v. Bank of America Nat. Trust and Savings Assn., 303
U. S. 350.
'! Manhattan Prop. v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U. S. 320, 54 Sup. Ct.
385.
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it seems obvious that the changes of the Committee on the
Judiciary in the wording of the Railroad Coordinator's draft,
by which "actual" was inserted before "damage" and "deter-
mined in accordance with principles obtaining in equitable pro-
ceedings" added as a guide, were intended to call emphatically
to the attention of those administering the reorganization section
the requirement that only those damages susceptible of definite
proof should be allowed. A limitation on damages cannot be
inferred from the language as enacted. As reorganizations had
been traditionally carried on in equity and would be carried on
in a bankruptcy court with equity powers, it was natural to add
the clause as to equitable proceedings. Leases were placed'upon
the same basis as executory contracts.1 1 '
While it could be said that the general rule in equity
receiverships was that only accrued damages could be proven,
there was no discernible equitable rule for the determination of
damages for rejection or nonadoption of an unexpired lease.
The actual damages from the breach were not determined.
At the most an arbitrary time limit was set on proof. The
reference to equity proceedings does not refer to any rule for
the measure of damages in equity receivership.' 12 In their
administration of estates, whether railroad or non-railroad,
claims for future rents depended for their provability upon the
fact or reentry,113 the existence of a clause for indemnity in case
of breach, 114 or the incidence of the maturity of the rent claim
under the local law.1 1
"The damages recovered by an injured party," said
Mr. Justice Reed in the Connecticut case,1 6 "have always been
limited to his 'actual' damages. There is nothing to indicate
that the Congress intended to have 'actual' interpreted as
I Connecticut Ry. and Lighting Co. v. Palmer et al., 305 U. S.
493, 59 S. Ct. 316.
Connecticut Ry. and Lighting Co. v. Palmer et al., 305 U. S.
493, 59 S. Ct. 316.
Gardiner v. Butler & Co., 245 U. S. 603, 38 Sup. Ct. 214.
u4Wm. Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed, 245 U. S. 597.
" Gardiner v. Butler & Co., 245 U. S. 603, 38 Sup. Ct. 214, Wake
Development Co. v. Auburn-Fuller Co., 71 F. (2d) 702; Moore v.
McDuffle, 71 F. (2d) 729; In re McAllister-Mohler Co., 46 F. (2d) 91;
Gerdes, Corporate Reorganizations, sees. 687-88.
"'Connecticut Ry. and Lighting Co. v. Palmer et al., 305 U. S.
493, 59 S. Ct. 316.
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faccruned'. The measure of damages applied by the courts for
the breach of a lease, where damages are permitted, is uniform.
In William Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed, 245 U. S. 597, 602, and in
Kuener v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U. S. 445, 450, this Court said
in analagous situations that the measure was the present value
of the rent reserved less the present rental value of the
remainder of the term."
The English Bankruptcy Act permits proof of future
rents, as any claim is provable which is "as to mode of valuation,
capable of being ascertained by fixed rules or as matter of
opinion. "117 The measure of damages is the same."18 The
difficulties of proof are well recognized.119 Since insolvencies
are more frequent in economic depressions and since, as a conse-
quence, estimates of the rental value of the remainder of the
term are given under subnormal business conditions, the
difficulties are multiplied.
120
Judges in equitable proceedings will have the advantage of
evidence in applying the usual rules as to the measure of
damages. It is well understood that such evidence must show
damages to reasonable certainty. Mere "plausible anticipation"
does not merit consideration nor are flights into the realm of
pure speculation entitled to be treated as evidence. 12 1 The
determination of the amount to be allowed as the damage will be
based on evidence which satisfies the mind.
2 2
Such is now the law in respect of the rejection of a lease
by the trustee under Section 77, but the effect of the act has not
yet been interpreted where the trustee "adopts" an executory
contract or lease.
It has been a hitherto generally recognized power of a
receiver or trustee to bind the bankrupt estate by adopting
executory contracts and leases. This power is now seriously
I Act of 1914, 4 and 5 Geo. V, c. 59, sec. 30(8) (c).
In re Tickle, 3 Morr. 126; Ex parte Llynvi Coal and Iron Co.,
L. R. 7 Ch. App. 28; In re Hinks, Ex parte Verdi, 3 Morr. 218; In re
Carruthers, 2 Mans. 172; Hardy v. Fothergill, L. R. 13 A. C. 358, where
a claim on covenant to deliver well repaired at end of fifty-year term
was held provable.
no Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 721.
Connecticut Ry. and Lighting Co. v. Palmer et al., 305 U. S.
493, 59 S. Ct. 316.
' Sutherland By. and Damages, Vol. I, Fourth Ed., section 121.
Connecticut Ry. and Lighting Co. v. Palmer et al., 305 U. S.
493, 59 S. Ct. 316.
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restricted by Section 77, subsection (b) of the Bankruptcy Act
as amended 1935, which is in part as follows:
"A plan or reorganization within the meaning of this section
* * * may reject contracts of the debtor which are executory in
whole or in part, including unexpired leases; and may include any
other appropriate provisions not inconsistent with this section.
"The adoption of an executory contract or unexpired lease by
the trustee or trustees of a debtor shall not preclude a rejection of
such contract or lease in a plan of reorganization approved here-
under, and any claim resulting from such rejection shall not have
priority over any other claims against the debtor because such con-
tract or lease had been previously adopted * * *."
The apparent effect of this section is to give an entirely new
meaning to the term "adopt". Under this section, "adoption"
of an executory contract or lease means simply an agreement by
the trustee to comply with its terms so long as the administra-
tion continues. Previously, when a contract had been adopted,
as has been heretofore said, there was no basis for any claim for
prospective failure of consideration, for both the lessor and the
lessee, including the lessee's receiver, were obliged to perform
under the terms of the agreement. But under this Act the
trustee can only promise to perform so long as the trusteeship
continues. This leaves the other party with nothing more than a
right to prove a claim against the estate in case the contract
should be rejected by the reorganization plan; in such a situation
it is submitted he is relieved of his obligations. The actual
effect of this provision, it would seem, is to prevent the effective
adoption of any contract by a trustee.123
CONCLUSION
Future rent, as such, is not a fixed liability absolutely owing
at the time so as to render it a provable claim against the estate
of the insolvent in an equity receivership proceeding, nor was it
provable in a bankruptcy proceeding prior to the amendment
to Section 63 (a) (7) of the Bankruptcy Act which made a claim
for future rent provable not to exceed one year's rent, and the
passage of Section 777B (b) (10), which made future rent
provable for three years. Section 77 rendered future rent
provable for the amount of actual damage sustained by the
lessor.
'Friendly, Amendment of Railroad Reorganization Act (1936)
36 Col. L. Rev. 27.
K. L. J.-6
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If the tenant, however, defaulted in the payment of rent or
otherwise breached his contract of lease prior to filing his
petition in bankruptcy, damages for such breach immediately
accrued and are necessarily, therefore, a fixed liability absolutely
owing at the time so as to render the claim provable in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding.
Where the contract is breached subsequent to the tenant's
insolvency, and the contract contains an acceleration clause
providing that full damages are to accrue immediately upon
default and that such damages are for compensation and not a
penalty, claim for such damages may, by such provision be
rendered provable, unless the receiver or trustee elects to reject
the contract thereby rendering the claim not provable.
If a receiver or trustee adopts the contract of lease and
accepts its benefits, he necessarily assumes its burdens and
liabilities, binding the trust estate to its terms. In such a case
the receiver or trustee is liable to the lessor for all rent then
owing and thereafter to accrue, according to the covenants and
stipulations of the lease. A possible exception to this rule may
be the case where a trustee acting under Section 77 adopts a
lease, but the approved plan of reorganization, by authority of
the Act, nevertheless disregards such adoption by the trustee
and, by its provisions, fails to accept the lease.
A receiver or trustee may accept or reject an executory
contract or lease, but he may not abrogate it; the contract
remains binding as between the landlord and tenant. If the
contract is not carried out according to its terms, by the trustee,
the landlord may have an action for damages against the
tenant, his discharge in bankruptcy nothwithstanding, for if
his claim is not provable, neither is it discharged by bank-
ruptcy. It is submitted that if a receiver or trustee may not
abrogate a contract, neither may a plan of reorganization under
Section 77. It is likely, then, that where a trustee has accepted
a lease, and such lease is thereafter repudiated by the terms of
the plan, the landlord, not having accepted the plan, and having
an action for damages against the lessee, as a result of the
repudiation, may possibly pursue his action against the property
of the lessee in the hands of the reorganized company, under the
doctrine advanced in the Boyd Case. There are no cases, how-
ever, under Section 77, in which this point has been raised.
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*Where a receiver or trustee has not adopted the lease he is
no more liable for rent accrued prior to receivership than he is
liable for any other debt owing by the insolvent at the date of
his appointment. In such a case the lessor has a claim for the
accrued rent, but the claim ranks in a class with all other
unsecured creditors of the bankrupt. If by the terms of the
contract, or by state law, the lessor holds a lien as security for
unpaid rent, however, the court will then enforce such lien
against the property of the lessee subject to such lien in the
hands of the receiver, and to the extent of the lien the landlord
will be a preferred creditor.
Rent accruing during the period that the receiver pro-
visionally operates railroad property is in no way governed by
the stipulations of the lease, but such rent will be paid according
to the earnings of the leased property. The injured lessor may,
of course, upon default of any part of the stipulated rental
demand the return of the leased property, thereby showing his
lack of acquiescence and his refusal to recognize the abrogation
of his full rights under the contract, and upon the court's or the
receiver's failure to recognize such demand, the lessor will then
be in a position to dictate the terms for any future use of the
property. Thereafter, if the lessee continues to use the property,
he will be liable for the full rental stipulated in the lease, or for
any other terms set forth by the lessor.
It seems to be then, according to the weight of authority,
that rent accrued prior to receivership in the absence of a
specific lien, is nothing more than an unsecured claim against the
estate; that rent accruing during the receivership will be pre-
ferred only to the extent of the net earnings of the leased
property and will not be paid at all if the property shows no
net earnings and that future rent is not a provable claim, with
the exceptions aforementioned. The entire situation will, of
course, be altered upon the adoption of the lease by the
receiver for in such a case thereafter all rent accrued, accruing,
and to accrue in the future becomes a preferential debt against
all the property, in the hands of the receiver.
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